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Redundancy mechanisms such as triple modular redundancy protect safety-critical components by replication and
thus improve systems fault tolerance. However, the gained fault tolerance comes along with costs to be invested,
e.g., increasing execution time, energy consumption, or packaging size, for which constraints have to be obeyed
during system design. This turns the question of finding suitable combinations of components to be protected into
a challenging task as the number of possible protection combinations grows exponentially in the number of compo-
nents. We propose family-based approaches to tackle the combinatorial blowup in redundancy systems modeling
and analysis phases. Based on systems designed in SIMULINK we show how to obtain models that include all
possible protection combinations and present a tool chain that, given a probabilistic error model, generates discrete
Markov chain families. Using symbolic techniques that enable concise family representation and analysis, we show
how SIMULINK models of realistic size can be protected and analyzed with a single family-based analysis run while
a one-by-one analysis of each protection combination would clearly exceed any realistic time constraints.
Keywords: Redundancy, fault tolerance, model-based stochastic analysis, probabilistic model checking, SIMULINK.
1. Introduction
Fault tolerance plays a significant role in the de-
sign of safety-critical systems as it enables a sys-
tem to continue functioning in the presence of
faults. The key underlying technique to achieve
fault tolerance is provided by redundancy, i.e.,
mechanisms to discover and evaluate faults de-
pending on the behaviors of replicated system
components. For instance, components can be
protected by triple modular redundancy (TMR)
where the component is triplicated and their re-
sults are processed through a majority voting
mechanism into a single output. Though pro-
tecting components reduces the overall probabil-
ity of failure, it increases costs in terms of, e.g.,
the systems packaging size, energy consumption,
production costs, or execution time. These costs
hinder to apply the naive approach of protecting
all system components to maximize reliability and
motivate the task of protecting only some compo-
nents towards a good tradeoff between reliability
and costs. However, the number of possible pro-
tection combinations grows exponentially in the
number of components, which renders the design
of redundancy systems a challenging task: Sys-
tems designers might have to model and analyze
a huge amount of protection combinations before
they find a combination that achieves a satisfac-
tory tradeoff. As even the (tradeoff) analysis of
a single protection combination can take a signif-
icant amount of time, this iterative development
cycle is likely to exceed time constraints. Further-
more, one might be not interested in a protection
combination that is only satisfactory but optimal
with respect to the tradeoff, rendering an exhaus-
tive analysis of all combinations inevitable.
To tackle the aforementioned challenges when
modeling and analyzing redundancy systems, we
propose to use family-based approaches (see, e.g.,
[3, 8, 10, 22]) where a single family model com-
prises the behaviors of all protection combina-
tions. First, such approaches avoid modeling each
protection combination individually and to use
an automated generation of any combination out
from the family model. Thus, the design pro-
cess of redundancy systems turns from alternating
modeling and analyzing phases to a single model-
ing phase followed by an analysis phase those re-
sults yield suitable protection combinations. Sec-
ond, family-based approaches enable an all-in-
one analysis where the family model is analyzed
in a single run instead of analyzing each family
member in isolation. This allows for exploiting
commonalities between the family members us-
ing symbolic representations and analysis opera-
tions, e.g., by binary decision diagrams (BDDs,
cf. [4, 18]). In the feature-oriented systems do-
main [22], such symbolic techniques have shown
drastic speedups for quantitative analyses [10] es-
pecially when family members share lots of be-
haviors. As redundancy mechanisms introduce
several identical components in the system, re-
dundancy systems are naturally eligible for such
a concise model representation and analyses us-
ing symbolic methods. Especially when one is
interested in optimal protection combinations for
which an exhaustive analysis of all family mem-
bers can hardly be avoided, such an all-in-one
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analysis might mitigate the limits induced by the
combinatorial blow-up in the number of system
components.
We demonstrate the benefits of family-based
approaches for the modeling and analysis of re-
dundancy systems by a tool chain where redun-
dancy mechanisms are introduced in SIMULINK
models and a family-based analysis is performed
on discrete Markov chain (DTMC) families us-
ing the symbolic probabilistic model checker
PRISM [15]. Our SIMULINK models with re-
dundancy are obtained by an annotative approach
where SIMULINK blocks following the model-
based redundancy technique (MORE, cf. [9]).
Specifically, we consider SIMULINK redundancy
design patterns such as comparison, voting (i.e.,
TMR), and sparing that replace SIMULINK blocks
amendable for protection in combination with a
probabilistic error model. For the automated gen-
eration of the DTMC family model, we employ
SIMPARS and OPENERRORPRO [20].
As illustrative case studies we issue two con-
trol loops modeled in SIMULINK: a proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) controller and a velocity
control loop (VCL) of an aircraft velocity model
borrowed from the SIMULINK example set [1].
While the PID family comprises 64 members with
comparably small model sizes the VCL has 65 536
family members those state space exceeds 1011
states, making symbolic methods for their anal-
ysis inevitable. First, we synthesize protection
combinations in the PID example that are opti-
mal with respect to tradeoffs expressed through
quantiles [5, 6], i.e., maximizing the number of
control loop rounds where the probability of fail-
ure is guaranteed to be below a given thresh-
old. This example shows that our approach can
be used to investigate properties that can hardly
be analyzed using de-facto standard simulative
approaches. Second, we determine protection
combinations in the VCL model that are Pareto-
optimal with respect to the probability of failure
within two rounds of the control loop and its exe-
cution time, solving the following problems:
(1) minimize the probability of failure while stay-
ing within a given execution time, and
(2) minimize execution time while not exceeding
a certain probability of failure.
We show that for the VCL model an all-in-one
analysis gains a speedup in three orders of magni-
tude compared to the one-by-one analysis. In par-
ticular, the presented all-in-one analysis manages
to obtain results in less than 5 hours while a one-
by-one analysis would require around 250 days
of computing time, clearly exceeding acceptable
time constraints in systems design.
Outline. Section 2 discusses related work and
techniques used in the paper. The general ap-
proach towards SIMULINK family models with re-
dundancy and their translation into DTMC fami-
lies is described in Section 3. In Section 4 the
analysis of PID and VCL families is carried out
and optimal protections are synthesized. We close
our paper and discuss further work in Section 5.
2. Related Work and Concepts
Probabilistic Model Checking. For the analy-
sis of Markovian stochastic models, probabilistic
model checking (PMC, cf. [4]) is an automated
technique that has been successfully applied to
numerous real-world case studies to analyze sys-
tems performance and Quality of Service. We rely
on discrete Markov chains (DTMCs) as stochastic
model, i.e., state-transition graphs where the tran-
sitions are purely probabilistic. Symbolic meth-
ods can compete with the well-known state-space
explosion problem by concise model represen-
tations, e.g., through binary decision diagrams
(BDDs, cf. [4, 18]). The prominent PMC tool
PRISM [15] uses multi-terminal BDDs [2, 11] for
a purely symbolic analysis without the use of
an enumerative model representation. It is well-
known that the size of symbolic representations by
BDDs is sensitive to the so-called variable order.
In [14], variable-reordering techniques towards a
compact state-space representation have been in-
troduced for PRISM. This enabled the analysis
of large-scale systems and speedup their analy-
sis, e.g., for the all-in-one family-based analysis
of feature-oriented systems [8, 10]. Family-based
synthesis using symbolic PMC towards optimal
system configurations has been detailed in [3].
Reliability Analysis and Variability in
SIMULINK. Reliability analysis of SIMULINK
using verification techniques has been consid-
ered in [13], where a handcrafted tool chain
from SIMULINK to the programming language
LUSTRE in combination with the SCADE design
verifier has been used. The MODIFI approach
presented in [21] implements fault-injection
capabilities in SIMULINK to evaluate error han-
dling mechanisms. However, their error model
is non-probabilistic and their analysis method is
based on simulations – an extension of this work
towards a stochastic reliability analysis thus is
not as easy. In [7] a transformation of SIMULINK
models to continuous-time Markov chains is
presented, used to perform dependability analysis
using the model checker PRISM. Variability
modeling in SIMULINK has been considered in
[12], using a direct implementation of a delta-
oriented approach. As we will show, we do not
have to rely on this powerful formalism to model
families of redundancy systems. However, their
approach could possibly be combined towards
a family-based analysis of a great variety of
SIMULINK models.
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DEPM and OPENERRORPRO. The Dual-graph
Error Propagation Model (DEPM, [19]) com-
prises a state-based model of the control- and
data-flow, both linked to a stochastic error model.
In contrast to (static) fault-tree analysis [17],
DEPMs can capture recurrent and hierarchical be-
haviors. OPENERRORPRO is a tool that pro-
vides the automated generation from DEPMs to
its DTMC semantics in terms of PRISM code,
enabling the analysis of DEPMs for manifold
properties by a great variety of tools. Also
due to OPENERRORPRO’s support of many base-
line formalisms that can be translated to DEPMs,
they are well-suited for the reliability analy-
sis of safety-critical systems. For instance,
SIMULINK models can be translated to DEPMs
using SIMPARS [20].
Further Methods in Reliability Analysis.
Simulation-based approaches are the usual
method for reliability analysis. However, as
faults are usually rare events with a relatively
small probability, sufficient confidence in analysis
results are difficult to achieve. We are aware
of techniques that could circumvent these is-
sues (see, e.g., [16] for an overview) but their
implementation would have went far behind
the purpose of this paper and such approaches
would not allow for a tradeoff analysis in terms of
quantiles.
Symbolic techniques for the reliability analy-
sis of safety-critical systems have been first and
foremost applied to tackle the state-space explo-
sion system, e.g., in the field of fault-tree analysis
(see, e.g., [17]). We are not aware of any appli-
cation that uses such techniques also to compete
with the combinatorial blowup in the number of
system configurations such as protection mecha-
nisms we deal with in this paper.
3. From SIMULINK to DTMC Families
The core of our approach towards a family-based
analysis of SIMULINK models with various pro-
tection combinations lies in the generation of
SIMULINK models with redundancy that can be
transformed into DTMC families. We illustrate
the modeling and the step by step transforma-
tion using the SIMULINK model of a proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) controller. A PID is one
of the most important and widely used feedback
controllers to apply accurate and responsive cor-
rection to a control function, essential for many
industry areas such as aerospace, process control,
manufacturing, and robotics. Figure 1 shows the
SIMULINK PID controller using separate blocks
for the P, I, and D terms.
3.1. Protecting SIMULINK Blocks
To introduce redundancy mechanisms into
SIMULINK models, we consider syntactic trans-
Fig. 1. PID controller is designed SIMULINK with separate
blocks for the P, I, and D terms.
formation rules that describe how to obtain
protected blocks from non-protected ones.
Specifically, we consider here the following three
redundancy mechanisms:
(comparison) The block is duplicated and both
outputs are compared. In case their output dif-
fers a dedicated failure state is reached. Oth-
erwise, the output is the one of both blocks.
(voting) Following the triple-modular-
redundancy principle (TMR), the block
is triplicated and the output is based on a
majority decision.
(sparing) One block is operational and the re-
maining two blocks serve as spares. If an er-
ror in an active block is detected by a built-in
error detection unit, a spare block takes over.
Figure 2 illustrates how to obtain protections from
a given block, exemplified by the P term of the
PID controller. Note that these patterns are mod-
eled in such a way that that they share most of
the behaviors by using multiple times the original
block, compare block, and switch block.
3.2. SIMULINK Models with Redundancy
The general workflow of our approach towards
a DTMC family and their analysis out from
SIMULINK models is depicted in Figure 3 us-
ing the PID example. First, blocks in the base-
line model are annotated with the types of pro-
tections that should be considered, e.g., compar-
ison, voting, and sparing. In Figure 3, we anno-
tated voting protections for the P and D term in the
PID example (indicated by shaded blocks). Then,
the annotated base-line model is transformed to a
SIMULINK model that includes redundancies by
replacing every block x with a switch block x s
those purpose is to select the protection mecha-
nism, followed by the redundancy blocks illus-
trated in the Figure 2 according to the type an-
notations. The switch depends on a free variable
x pm that stands for the kind of protection chosen
– the output of the switch connect to the inputs of
the selected mechanism x pm. Thus, by setting
the variable x pm, e.g., to “no” or “voting”, the
control flow of the model either follows no pro-
tection or the voting protection, respectively. The
final SIMULINK model with redundancy resulting
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(a) comparison (b) voting (c) sparing
Fig. 2. Redundancy mechanisms for SIMULINK blocks, illustrated for a P element
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Fig. 3. Schema of the approach, obtaining DTMC families from annotated SIMULINK models
from the PID controller possibly protecting the P
and D term with the voting pattern is depicted in
the center of Figure 3. Note that this model stands
for a family of controllers comprising four fam-
ily members that can be selected by setting vari-
ables p pm and d pm to either “no” or “voting”.
Hence, a redundancy systems designer does not
have to model each protection combination in iso-
lation but only has to specify the syntactic protec-
tion rules and annotate blocks for protection – the
resulting SIMULINK model with the desired pro-
tections can easily be selected through choosing
the switch variables.
3.3. DTMC Families
Having obtained the SIMULINK model with re-
dundancy that stands for a family of models
with different protection combinations, we use
SIMPARS to generate a Dual-graph Error Propa-
gation Model (DEPM) [20] preserving the switch
variables x pm as data elements. For this,
we employ an error model that assigns to each
SIMULINK block the probability for some fault
occurring in this block. This simple error model
could also imagined to involve further SIMULINK
blocks or statistical data about faults. In the last
step towards DTMC families, PRISM code rep-
resenting the family of DTMCs that models the
control flow and fault propagation is automatically
generated using the tool OPENERRORPRO [19].
Also in this step, switch variables are maintained
such that also single family members can be ex-
tracted from the DTMC family member by choos-
ing protection mechanisms in the switch variables
of the PRISM model.
4. Family-based Analysis of
Redundancy Systems
The DTMC families generated using the approach
we sketched in the last section enable a family-
based reliability analysis. We illustrate the ben-
efits of such analyses for the PID example and a
large-scale family of a protected aircraft velocity
control loop (VCL). Both model a control loop
that operates in rounds, i.e., starting with initial
values of data at the beginning, each round is con-
sidered to start when the values of data modified in
the last execution of the control loop is fed again
as input. For an analysis using the symbolic prob-
abilistic model checker PRISM [15] we then con-
sidered the following reliability properties:
(pfail) What is the failure probability in n
rounds?
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Table 1. PID analysis results for (pfail) with n = 10 and (qround) with θ = 3·10−4
D:– D:c D:v D:s
I P:– P:c P:v P:s P:– P:c P:v P:s P:– P:c P:v P:s P:– P:c P:v P:s
– 6.1 5.2 5.2 6.1 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 6.1 5.2 5.2 6.1
c 4.4 3.5 3.5 4.4 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.8 4.4 3.5 3.5 4.4
v 4.4 3.5 3.5 4.4 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.8 4.4 3.5 3.5 4.4
(p
fa
il)
in
1
0
−
5
s 6.1 5.2 5.2 6.1 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 6.1 5.2 5.2 6.1
– 43 50 50 43 75 100 100 73 75 100 100 75 43 50 50 43
c 60 75 75 60 150 300 300 151 150 300 300 151 60 75 75 60
v 60 75 75 60 149 299 299 151 149 299 299 151 60 75 75 60
(q
ro
un
d)
s 43 50 50 43 75 100 100 73 75 100 100 75 43 50 50 43
Table 2. Statistics to the analysis experiments
case study property parameter states all-in-one analysis one-by-one analysis
nodes time [s] Σ nodes time [s]
PID (pfail) n = 10 6 781 782 16 935 12.9 240 946 37.8
(qround) θ = 0.0003 ” ” 6 693.1 ” 2 531.4
VCL (pfail) n = 2 4.7·1013 1 949 466 17 344.1 ≈1.2·1012 ≈2.2·107
(qround) What is the maximal number of rounds
in which the system can guarantee a failure
probability below some threshold θ?
The first property is a standard reliability property
while the second is a quantile [5, 6]. We rely
on an error model that assigns a fault probability
of 10−5 to each SIMULINK block. Throughout
presenting the results we abbreviate the redun-
dancy mechanisms for SIMULINK blocks as
follows: “–” stands for no protection, “c” for
comparison, “v” for voting, and “s” for sparing.
All experiments were carried outa using PRISM
supporting variable reordering techniques [14].
4.1. Analysis of the PID Controller
For the analysis of the PID controller, we anno-
tate the PID SIMULINK model of Figure 1 with
all the protection mechanisms explained in Sec-
tion 3.1. Applying the three redundancy mech-
anisms thus yields a SIMULINK model with re-
dundancy that depends on the choice of three
switch variables selecting the protection combina-
tions. Hence, after the automated translation of
aHardware setup: Intel Xeon E5-2680@2.70GHz, 128 GB
RAM; Turbo Boost and HT disabled; Debian GNU/Linux 9.1
the model using SIMPARS and OPENERRORPRO,
we obtain a DTMC family comprising 43 = 64
protection combinations. We then analyzed the
(pfail) property with a parameter of n = 10. The
results provided in Table 1 show that the com-
parison and voting patterns have higher impacts
to protect blocks with a slight advantage for vot-
ing. This is even more apparent when considering
the (qround) property, also depicted in Table 1.
Here, for guaranteeing a failure probability below
θ = 3·10−4, a PID that is fully protected by com-
parison or voting “survives” seven times longer
than an unprotected or with sparing protected PID.
For obtaining these results, we performed both, a
naive one-by-one analysis where every member of
the family is analyzed in isolation and an all-in-
one analysis. However, due to the small number of
family members, the all-in-one analysis has only
slight advantages to the one-by-one analysis.
4.2. The Velocity Control Loop Model
To illustrate our approach on a large-scale family
of SIMULINK protections, we issue a velocity con-
trol loop (VCL) of an aircraft model. Our model
is a simplified version of the aircraft model bor-
rowed from the SIMULINK example set [1] that
itself is based on a long-haul passenger aircraft
flying at cruising altitude and speed, adjusting the
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Fig. 4. The SIMULINK aircraft velocity control loop (VCL) model, blocks to be protected highlighted
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Fig. 5. Configurations Pareto optimal with respect to execu-
tion time and probability of failure within two rounds
fuel flow rate to control the aircraft velocity. Fig-
ure 4 shows the SIMULINK model where the eight
blocks amendable for protection mechanisms are
shaded. Note that the VCL also includes the PID
controller from the previous example. On each
of these blocks we applied the redundancy mech-
anisms comparison, voting, and sparing as de-
scribed in Section 3.2, resulting in 48 = 65 536
combinations of protections. After applying the
transformations of Section 3, we first analyzed the
generated DTMC family against the (pfail) prop-
erty. Here, we used both, an all-in-one approach
performing the analysis on a single family model,
and (partially) a one-by-one approach, checking
each combination of protections separately. We
can already observe from the statistics in Table 2
that the generated DTMC family model requires
symbolic techniques to be analyzed by an all-in-
one analysis due to the massive size of the state
space. To estimate the sizes of models and anal-
ysis times for a one-by-one, we considered 655
randomly generated instances of the family (i.e.,
around 1% of the family members) as analyzing
all family members in isolation clearly would have
exceeded time constraints. This fact is already
underpinned by the size and and analysis times
for the randomly generated instances, ranging up
to 1.6 · 1011 states requiring 5 093.922 seconds
of analysis time. As even single instances have
this magnitude of model sizes and symbolic rep-
resentations, one can already estimate that our ap-
proach exploiting redundancy through symbolic
representations is viable. The one-by-one analy-
sis of all 655 randomly generated family members
took around 60.4 hours such that we estimate the
whole analysis for all 65 536 protection combina-
tions would take more than 250 days of computa-
tion time. This demonstrates a speedup of three
orders of magnitude an all-in-one analysis yields
compared to an exhaustive one-by-one analysis.
4.2.1. Synthesis of Optimal Tradeoff Protections
To investigate the tradeoff between execution time
and reliability, we measured the impact of pro-
tection mechanisms on the execution time of one
round [9]. Without any protection, each round
required 61 time units to be executed, increased
by timings for each protection shown in Table 3.
As the all-in-one analysis provided the results for
each protection combination in the family model,
we hence can easily compute the execution time
per round for each combination and relate them
to their reliability properties. Figure 5 depicts
for each family member the probability of failure
within two rounds (property (pfail)) and its costs
in terms of execution time. The line at the left
indicates the Pareto front, which directly yields
the optimal protection combinations when either
fixing constraints on the probability of failure or
execution time. Pareto-optimal configurations are
shown in Table 4, where the protection combina-
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Table 3. Impact of protections on one-round execution time
block comparison voting sparing
P term 10 15 9
I term 15 23 14
D term 14 22 13
Signal Builder 10 15 9
Fuel Mass 10 15 9
Subtract 12 18 13
Vehicle Mass 10 15 9
vCruise 10 15 9
tions correspond to the chosen protections for the
blocks in the order of Table 3, i.e., the combina-
tion “ - - c - s - - - ” stands for protecting the D
term block with comparison and the Fuel Mass
block with sparing. Similar to the plain PID ex-
Table 4. Pareto-optimal protection combinations
combination exec. time prob. of failure
c c c s c c c s 150 1.4995·10−4
c c c - c c c - 132 1.4997·10−4
c c c - s c c - 131 1.5994·10−4
c - c - c c c - 117 1.5997·10−4
c - c - s c c - 116 1.6994·10−4
c - c - c - c - 105 1.6997·10−4
c - c - s - c - 104 1.7994·10−4
- - c - c - c - 95 1.7997·10−4
- - c - c - - - 85 1.8997·10−4
- - c - s - - - 84 1.9994·10−4
- - - - c c - - 83 1.9997·10−4
- - c - - - - - 75 1.9998·10−4
- - - - c - - - 71 2.0997·10−4
- - - - s - - - 70 2.1994·10−4
- - - - - - - - 61 2.1998·10−4
ample, we observe that protection with compari-
son has great impact on the probability of failure,
appearing in most of the Pareto-optimal combina-
tions. Voting does not show up in optimal com-
binations (although possibly as good as compar-
ison by means of gained fault tolerance) due to
its comparably high execution time (see Table 3).
Sparing does not reduce the probability of failure
as much as comparison and voting, but has good
timing characteristics such that it appears at some
occasions in the Pareto-optimal combinations.
Remarks on Limitations. Whereas impossible
for the quantile property, the standard reliability
property asking for the probability of failure
within a fixed number of rounds could also be
evaluated using simulation-based approaches.
However, due to the relatively small probability
of faults in each P, I, or D term, we were not
able to perform statistical model checking with
sufficient confidence in either the PID and VCL
model. We also performed analyses for the
quantile property (qround), but due to the size
of the models already single instances of the
DTMC family could not be analyzed within a
week of computation such that we dropped an ex-
haustive study of this property for the VCL model.
4.2.2. Further Techniques Applied
As usual, automatically generated models for
PRISM do not admit a good variable ordering for
their concise symbolic representation via MTB-
DDs and thus require post-processing steps to
be amendable for a formal analysis (see, e.g.,
[8, 14]). Within our tool chain, things were
actually worse as even single instances of the
OPENERRORPRO generated DTMCs could not be
built without either running out of memory or tak-
ing several days before interrupting the building
process. To enable an analysis of our models, we
had to apply the following post-processing steps
on the generated VCL model.
Reset Value Optimization. Thanks to the
control- and data-flow models in the DEPM meta
model, we used standard graph algorithms applied
for each data element to determine those control-
flow locations where the data is never read before
it is written again. For the minimal control-flow
locations (with respect to the control-flow order)
we reinitialized the value of the data storage to
the value it has at the initial control-flow location.
The ratio behind this optimization is that the
state-space is reduced by joining naively bisimilar
states where data values do not have impact on
the future behaviors.
Iterative Variable Reordering. We exploited
further the sensitivity of MTBDD represented
models to its variable ordering. For this, we
successively built subfamily models, iteratively
adding protection mechanisms to each block and
performing variable reordering [14] to determine
a suitable variable order.
5. Discussion and Further Work
We proposed to use family-based approaches for
the modeling and analysis of redundancy models
to overcome limitations imposed by the combina-
torial blowup that arises when protecting system
components. To illustrate the approach, we pre-
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sented a tool chain that enables reliability analysis
of SIMULINK models with redundancy. In future,
we aim at further automating the handcrafted steps
in this tool chain, e.g., incorporating the optimiza-
tions done in Section 4.2.2 into OPENERRORPRO.
Note that although presented in the specific set-
ting for SIMULINK designs, our approach is ap-
plicable to many redundancy system models. In
particular, the tool chain we present enables to use
many base-line models supported by the tool used
for the automated translation towards DTMC fam-
ilies, e.g., by OPENERRORPRO [19], and the full
analysis power of properties that can be checked
for DTMCs using, e.g., by symbolic probabilistic
model checkers such as PRISM [15].
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